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Respondent, OLIVE M. WOODARD, by and through her 
counsel of record, David K. Smith, and pursuant to Rule 
24(b) of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, submits the 
following Brief. 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal 
pursuant to Rule 3(a) of the Rules of the Utah Court of 
Appeals, in that it is an appeal taken from a district court 
to the Utah Court of Appeals from a final judgment and is 
considered a matter of right pursuant to Rule 4(a) of the 
Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
This case involves an appeal from a final judgment 
of the Third Judicial District Court, the Honorable Kenneth 
Rigtrup presiding, rendered after a non-jury trial. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The following issues are presented to this Court for 
review: 
1. Did the trial court err in deciding the property 
4 
to be divided between the parties in regard to the property 
settlement portion of their divorce because: 
(a) It did not forthwith divide all 
property between the parties, though it left the Appellant 
with a remainder equity in certain of the property. 
(b) By allegedly failing to divide the 
marital assets equitably between the parties. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Appellant/Defendant (hereafter "Defendant") and 
Respondent/Plaintiff (hereafter "Plaintiff") were married to 
one another on August 1, 1933, and remained married for 
nearly 49 years. (Findings of Fact, paragraph 1) 
2. A Decree of Divorce was entered on February 23, 
1982, granting to the Plaintiff a divorce from the 
Defendant, and providing for a division of certain property 
between the parties. In essence, the Defendant received all 
of the marital property excepting for the balance due on a 
note in an approximate sum of $37,488.26, which was believed 
to have been secured by the Fenton Ave. property, and one-
half interest in a note on property located on Stratler. 
5 
(See paragraphs 4 and 6 of the Original Decree of Divorce) 
3. On May 25, 1984, the lower Court set aside the 
property division based upon evidence presented to the Court 
which demonstrated that the Defendant had failed to disclose 
that the Fenton Ave. contract was in fact unsecured, and in 
fact, worthless. The Court indicated that had it been aware 
of the unsecured status of the note on the Fenton Ave. sale 
at the time, it would not have divided the property in the 
manner in which it had done. (Paragraphs 3 & 4, Findings of 
Fact) 
4. In the subsequent trial from which this appeal 
is taken, it was learned that the Defendant had acquired 
three other properties prior to the entry of the divorce, 
and had not informed the Plaintiff nor the Court of this 
fact in the original divorce proceedings. (Findings of Fact, 
paragraph 19) 
5. The Defendant was given an opportunity to 
demonstrate what, if any liens remained against the three 
properties acquired by him, but not disclosed to the Court, 
and he failed to demonstrate that any recorded liens existed 
against the property. (Transcript, page 253, lines 3-7; 
Paragraph 19, Findings of Fact) 
6. The Defendant retains a mobile home on which he 
6 
resides, together with 30 acres of land near Fruitland, 
Utah, which is free and clear. He receives approximately 
$605.00 per month in Social Security Benefits, raises a milk 
goat, and has the capacity to raise a garden, if he wishes, 
to assist him in providing for his needs. (Findings of 
Fact, paragraphs 7 and 9) 
7. The Plaintiff receives $193.00 per month Social 
Security Benefits, and $165.00 per month in SSI benefits; 
she has no other source of income, other than baby sitting 
on occasion. She owns no real property and must rent at a 
present cost to her of $250.00 per month. (Findings of 
Fact, paragraphs 6 and 10) 
8. Both parties are presently approximately 74 
years of age. (Findings of Fact, paragraph 5) 
9. In attempting to fairly distribute the assets of 
the parties, the Court, in a Bench Decision, held that of 
the sums the Defendant received from his burn in 
approximately 1973, a portion of that would probably have 
represented a loss of future income, and thus a marital 
asset. While no set sum was determined from the burn 
recovery to have represented loss of future income, the 
Court did find that the Defendant imprudently managed these 
assets to a large degree and found that the Fruitland 
7 
property upon which the Defendant resides was purchased for 
$27,000.00, and the Court determined that this was a 
reasonable vaulation to be given for the personal injuries 
sustained by the Defendant from his burn settlement, and 
hence awarded the Defendant as his sole and separate 
property all of the Fruitland property, together with the 
trailer house, the well, water rights, and animals. 
10. The Court further found that the Defendant used 
approximately $35,500.00 of the monies received from his 
burn case to purchase and remodel the home located on 
Stratler, and that these funds were to be considered monies 
for loss of future income, a marital asset, and subject to 
equitable distribution between the parties. The Court noted 
that the Defendant received $12,000.00 of the down payment 
and several monthly installments without having made any 
accounting thereof to the Plaintiff. (Findings of Fact, 
paragraph 14) 
11. The Court then modified the alimony award from 
$1.00 per year to allow for a more equitable distribution of 
the remaining assets which were determined to be marital 
assets. The Plaintiff was given the right to liquidate the 
Bryan Ave. property, the Gregson Ave. property, and the 
Claybourne property, realizing the maximum amounts that 
8 
could be obtained under the circumstances from them. She 
was allowed to pay off any claims that may have existed 
against the properties in order to sell them outright. 
Those funds along with the net proceeds remaining with the 
Clerk of the Court from the Stratlor contract, were allowed 
to be placed with a federally insured institution, and the 
Court allowed the Plaintiff to receive $245.00 per month 
from these funds, and if this destroyed the SSI benefit, 
then the award was to be increased to offset the loss of the 
SSI award. The court did this because the income levels of 
the parties was unequal, and the trial judge was attempting 
to equalize the monthly incomes of each, without attempting 
to reduce the income received by the Defendant from his 
Social Security Benefit. (Conclusions of Law, paragraphs 28, 
29 and 30) 
12. The Court held that Mrs. Woodard was entitled to 
a monthly benefit so long as it lasts, and in the event that 
she died, one-half of any principal balance remaining was to 
go to her estate and the other half was to go to the 
Defendant's estate. (Conclusions of Law, paragraphs 32 and 
33) 
13. From the foregoing, it is apparent that the 
Court was attempting under these particular set of 
9 
circumstances, to maximize the income level of the Plaintiff 
to make it equal to that of the Defendant, and to distribute 
any balance after the death of the Plaintiff to the 
Defendant or his estate. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court judge specifically found that both 
the Plaintiff and the Defendant were mentally alert and 
reasonably fit for their chronological ages. And although 
the court recognized that the Defendant had some ongoing 
problems with his eyes and scarring attendant to his wounds, 
that he was functionally no more disabled than the 
Plaintiff. (Transcript, p. 248, lines 4-10) To suggest 
that the court failed to take into consideration the 
Defendant's continued pain and suffering and need for 
further medical care is untrue. 
The trial court further found that in recent times, 
namely in December, 1978 the Defendant received $30,450.00 
from Nancy Finch, and an additional $18,637.80 from Nancy 
Finch in December, 1979, and that he did not reasonably 
account for where the money went, nor did the Plaintiff have 
the use of any of those marital funds. (Findings of Fact, 
10 
paragraph 18) 
The agrument of the Defendant that the judge failed 
to take into account the Defendant's efforts and 
expenditures in repairing, improving and protecting the 
various parcels of property over the eight years subsequent 
to the initial divorce is likewise without merit. Despite 
repeated requests for an accounting of these matters by 
Plaintiff's counsel, the Defendant failed to produce one 
invoice or other documented piece of evidence to demonstrate 
any expenditure of time or money of his part in repairing or 
protecting any of the parcels of property subsequent to the 
divorce. In fact, the court found that although he was in a 
position to bring forth such evidence, the Defendant failed 
to do so. (Transcript, page 253, lines 3-7) 
The court further found that there was little or no 
cooperation from the Defendant in helping to identify 
marital assets, or bringing to attention to the court of 
assets which belonged to the marital estate, and that 
throughout the whole proceedings he "drug his feet." 
(Transcript, page 252, 3, lines 22-25 and 1-2) 
The court is granted considerable latitude in 
distributing the assets of the marital estate, and there is 
nothing which requires the trial judge under these 
11 
circumstances, to divide any of the assets immediately. In 
fact, the trial judge was more than equitable; inasmuch as 
his original intention was in the first decree of divorce 
was to award the Plaintiff two payments of $18,744.14 each 
from the sale of Fenton Ave., and under the present 
circumstances, the Plaintiff is only entitled to a monthly 
installment of $245.00, and her heirs are entitled to a 
remainder interest in one-half of the balance of any 
principal at her death. (Conclusions of Law, paragraph 32) 
ARGUMENT 
I 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In reviewing the findings and judgment of the trial 
court, after a trial on the merits, this Court must view the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, and 
the judgment must be affirmed if those findings are 
substantiated by the evidence. Sharpe v. American Medical 
Systems, Inc., 671 P.2d 185 (Utah, 1983). It is not the 
Court's duty to retry the facts and this Court must presume 
12 
that the trial court's findings are correct and, if they are 
supported by substantial evidence in the record, those facts 
should not be overturned. Further, this Court must view the 
evidence and all inferences that might be reasonably made 
from the evidence in a light most favorable to the judgment 
rendered. Hal Taylor Assocs. v. Union American, Inc., 657 
P.2d 743 (Utah, 1982). Litho Sales, Inc. v. Cutrubus, 636 
P.2d 487 (Utah, 1981). 
II 
THE TRIAL COURT IS GRANTED WIDE 
DISCRETION TO DISTRIBUTE MARITAL ASSETS. 
The trial court is given considerable discretion in 
adjusting the financial and property interests of the 
parties. Lee v. Lee, 744 P.2d 1378, 1380 (Utah, 1987); 
Smith y^ Smith, 751 P.2d 1149 (Utah App., 1988). 
Such a decision is not to be disturbed on appeal 
unless it is clearly unjust or an abuse of discretion. 
Gardner y^ Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076, 1978 (Utah, 1988). 
The record, and findings of fact and conclusions of 
this case clearly indicate an attempt on the part of the 
13 
trial judge to equitable distribute the remaining marital 
assets between the parties, and an attempt to award the 
Plaintiff with enough additional income, in light of the 
parties' circumstances, to equal that of the Defendant's 
income. The findings indicate this attempt, hence no 
reversible error was committed in failing to take into 
account either assets or the nature and extent of the needs 
of the parties. Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah, 
1987) . 
In Jones y^_ Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah, 1985) 
the Utah Supreme Court deliniated three factors that the 
trial court must consider in fixing alimony awards: (1) 
the financial conditions and needs of the spouse seeking 
alimony; (2) the ability of the spouse seeking alimony to 
produce sufficient income; and (3) the ability of the paying 
spouse to provide support. All three of these factors were 
considered by the trial court in this case. The trial court 
found that the Defendant had income of $605.00 per month 
while the Plaintiff had income of only $358.00 per month. 
The trial court further found that each party was 
substantially unemployable for all practical purposes. 
(Transcript, pabe 248, lines 11-25) The court did find that 
the Plaintiff did some baby-sitting from time to time, but 
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the Defendant lived on ground in Fruitland which provided 
him with an opportunity to raise animals and provide for 
some of his own basic needs off the land. Since the court 
felt the need to readjust the alimony award to make it more 
equitable (Transcript, page 251, lines 8-12), it 
nevertheless did not wish to increase the amount to be paid 
by the Defendant directly because he was essentially 
unemployable, and because of his low income. (Ibid) The 
increased income, sufficient to reach the income level 
maintained by the Defendant, was to come from the remainder 
of the marital assets, namely, the balance of the contract 
proceeds from the Stratler property, and whatever sums could 
be generated from the sale or other disposition of the three 
properties kept hidden by the Defendant until they were 
brought out by Plaintiff's counsel in trial, the Gregson 
property, the Bryan Ave. property, and the Claybourne 
property. 
The court was not required to make any provision for 
future medical needs of the Defendant, since (a) he 
demonstrated no specific need for future medical care, and 
(b) a portion of the award for his burns was to have covered 
future medical needs. 
The court found that the Fenton Ave. sale was left 
15 
unsecured by the Defendant; hence, there is nothing either 
party could have done to preserve or protect the Fenton Ave. 
property when Nancy Finch filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. 
Their claim was left unsecured. The blame for this 
mismanagement was laid at the feet of the Defendant by the 
trial judge. (Transcript, page 249, lines 14-17) 
III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO MAKE AN 
IMMEDIATE DIVISION OF MARITAL ASSETS 
Counsel for the Plaintiff relies upon the case of 
Owens v. Owens, 734 P.2d 414 (Utah, 1986) for the 
proposition that any division of marital assets must be 
immediate. In so doing, Counsel misreads the case. In that 
case the custodial parent was not awarded the family home, 
and the court found that it was the apparent intention of 
the parties to make an immediate division of the marital 
assets, primarily for the benefit of the custodial parent 
who did not have the benefit of the monies from the sale of 
the family home. The court found that the custodial parent 
indicated that she needed the money for the children. Since 
16 
the custodial parent was not awarded the home, the court 
found under those circumstances that a division of the 
equity should have been immediate. 
No such case is presented here. In fact, the trial 
court is attempting to equitably dispose of the marital 
assets, but is intentionally making an award of alimony from 
the marital assets, to insure that the Plaintiff has a 
stream of income for a period of years to equal the Social 
Security Income received by the Defendant. (Transcript, 
page 256, lines 4-14) It is possible, I suppose, that the 
trial court judge could have awarded the Plaintiff a sum of 
alimony from the Defendants assets and then made a division 
of marital property, but the trial court judge felt that 
prudence suggested that the funds are best preserved and the 
interests of the parties are best protected, if no such sum 
is taken from the Defendant, but said sums come from marital 
assets preserved to protect both the Plaintiff and the 
Defendant. 
The fact that there may be an immediate disparity in 
the division of the marital assets is not, in and of itself, 
grounds for reversal. Westingskow v. Westenskow, 562 P.2d 
1256 (Utah, 1977) And where there is a disparity in the 
education, income or earning potential between the parties, 
17 
the court held in Eames v. Eames, 735 P.2d 395 (Utah, 1987) 
that the husband's claimed right to receive interest in his 
one-half interest in the home's equity, until the home was 
sold, was offset by the wife's need to provide shelter and 
support for the parties' youngest child while the child 
attended college. The trial court judge in this case 
recognized the Supreme Court's recent positioning on these 
matters and noted that women in long-standing marriages, and 
inequitable situations, are entitled to deference when it 
comes to immediate distribution of marital assets. 
(Transcript, page 247, lines 18-25; Findings of Fact, 
paragraph 11) 
It should also be noted that prior to the divorce 
the Defendant had control over nearly $50,000.00, while the 
Plaintiff did not receive any of those funds for her use or 
benefit. (Transcript, page 253, lines 12-25). 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court judge bent over backwards in light 
of the Defendant's defiant attitude in hiding assets, and 
his failure to be forthcoming during discovery and at trial 
in regards to his "hidden" assets, to reach a fair and 
18 
equitable division of marital assets, while at the same time 
providing for an optimum benefit for alimony on the part of 
the Plaintiff. He did not take anything away from the 
Defendant's income to pay to the Plaintiff, but allowed the 
Plaintiff to manage the marital assets, and to secure to 
herself so much of the income as would be required to pay 
her sufficient to equal Defendant's income. Both are living 
at poverty level; however, Defendant has his own property 
free and clear, has the ability to raise animals and crops 
to partially care for his needs. Plaintiff has no such 
opporunity, and must rent. 
The decision of the trial court judge should not be 
disturbed. 
-4*\ DATED this ]Q_ day of July, 1989. 
fi^cJ |C .—3^ 
DAVID K. SMITH, ESQ. 
Attorney at Law 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Brief of Respondent, postage prepaid, 
to Roland Uresk and Machelle Fitzgerald, counsel for the 
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Defendant/Appellant, 156 North 200 East, Roosevelt, Utah 
- -fvv 
84066 this [£y_ day of July, 1989. 
DAVID K. SMITH, ESQ. 
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( P l a i n t i f f ' s E x h i b i t N o . 11 a d m i t t e d . ) 
THE COURT: A n y t h i n g e l s e ? 
MR. SMITH: I have nothing further, your 
Honor, except maybe a short argument. 
T H E COURT: Do we need the benefit of 
the record? 
Honor 
MR. SMITH: I don't believe so, your 
THE COURT: Do we? 
MR. URESK: No. 
(Argument given.) 
THE COURT: The Court originally entered 
a Decree of Divorce in this matter February 23rd, 
1982. In that decree, the Court, specifically in 
Paragraph No. 4 -- which I note is interlineated by 
the Court, so the Court's intention and understanding 
was crystal clear to the Court -- the Court awarded 
plaintiff, Mrs. Woodard, two installments due from 
Nancy Finch; one in the amount of $18,744.14 due 
December 1, 1981; and $18,744.44, due December 1, 
1982, together with any additional principal and 
accruing interest. 
It was the Court's perception following 
a hearing that there was monies due from Mrs. Finch, 
and the Court never realized that the property had 
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1 been deeded out to M r s . Finch, and that it was not a 
2 secured transaction. Ultimately, after that time, the 
3 Court was — or at some time, the Court became aware 
4 of a bankruptcy, but the Court didn't understand the 
5 unsecured nature of that transaction. 
6 So, accordingly, the Court subsequently 
7 -- following an appeal to the Supreme Court, the 
8 Supreme Court affirmed the decree as it was entered; 
9 though, as I recall, indicated that the -- there 
10 didn ft appear to be any disparity in the award the 
11 property set forth in that order. And T assume the 
12 record reflected the nature of the burn proceeds. 
13 The Court on May 25th, 1984, 
14 notwithstanding the completion of the appeal because 
15 of the fundamental misunderstanding of the record by 
16 the Court, determined to set aside the property 
17 distribution and reconsider the whole case. 
18 The statutes provide that the Court make 
19 an equitable distribution of property and income, and 
20 that's where we start. The Court observes, 
21 particularly in recent months, a number of decisions 
22 that recognize on the part of women, long marriages 
23 and inequitable situations with income, and T think 
24 have broadened what historically the Courts have done 
25 to solve these kinds of problems. 
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1 The Court finds that Mrs. Woodard at 
2 this date is 73 years of age, and that in 20 days, Mr. 
3 Woodard is 74 years of age. 
4 The Court finds that they are both 
5 mentally alert, reasonably fit for their chronological 
6 ages. And even though the Court recognizes that Mr. 
7 Woodard has some ongoing problems with his eyes and 
8 obviously has scarring attendant to his wounds, that 
9 in a functional way, he is no more disabled than is 
10 Mrs. Wood ard . 
11 The Court finds that Mr. Woodard is on 
12 social security, has income of $605, give or take a 
13 dollar or two each way. 
14 That Mrs. Woodard is on social security, 
15 and including a supplemental income award from social 
16 security of $165, has $358 per month. 
17 The Court finds that given their ages 
18 and their backgrounds, they are substantially 
19 unemployable for all practical purposes other than the 
20 Court does recognize that Mrs. Woodard does do 
21 baby-sitting from time to time. Mr. Woodard lives in 
22 Fruitland on some ground, which has provided him with 
23 an opportunity to raise animals and provide some of 
24 his own basic needs because of the land. 
25 Mr. Woodard received a very serious burn 
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1 i n j u r y on F e b r u a r y 2 8 t h , 1 9 7 1 , and i t ' s n o t c l e a r f r o m 
2 t h i s r e c o r d as to w h e n he r e c e i v e d h i s s e t t l e m e n t . I 
3 h a v e v a r i o u s r e f e r e n c e s to s o m e w h e r e in t h e r a n g e of 
4 7 2 , 7 3 , 7 4 , he r e c e i v e d a s e t t l e m e n t . And t h e 
5 e v i d e n c e s e e m s s o m e w h a t c l e a r , t h o u g h i t ' s w i t h s o m e 
6 d o u b t in t h e C o u r t ' s m i n d p r e c i s e l y h o w m u c h he 
7 r e c e i v e d , b u t e s s e n t i a l l y he r e c e i v e d s o m e w h e r e in t h e 
8 n e i g h b o r h o o d of $ 6 4 , 0 0 0 . 
9 T h e C o u r t f i n d s t h a t t h e r e h a s b e e n 
10 i m p r u d e n t m a n a g e m e n t of m a r i t a l a s s e t s as w e l l as h i s 
11 p r o p e r t y ; n a m e l y , o n e i n v e s t m e n t b e i n g m a d e in C e n t u r y 
12 M o r t g a g e in t h e a m o u n t of $ 2 0 , 0 0 0 , w h i c h w a s l o s t . 
13 T h e r e a l e s t a t e c l o s i n g w i t h M r s . F i n c h 
14 w a s c e r t a i n l y n o t d o n e in a r e a s o n a b l y p r u d e n t 
15 f a s h i o n , r e s u l t i n g in a p p a r e n t l o s s e s of an u n k n o w n 
16 a m o u n t as a r e s u l t of t h e t r a n s a c t i o n w i t h M r s . 
17 F i n c h . 
18 In a d d i t i o n , t r a n s a c t i o n s w h i c h a r e 
19 a s s e r t e d b y M r . W o o d a r d to h a v e b e e n m a d e w i t h M r . 
20 Evans do not appear to have been managed in a 
21 r e a s o n a b l e b u s i n e s s l i k e m a n n e r . 
22 Mr. Woodard was somewhere between the 
2*3 a g e s of 57 to 5 8 , 5 9 , w h e n he r e c e i v e d h i s s e t t l e m e n t , 
24 that of approximately $64,000. He has not since that 
25 time been gainfully employed in any substantial, 
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1 regular, gainful employment, 
2 It is apparent that at least a portion 
3 of that settlement was justified as a result of loss 
4 of future earnings; though, the Court does not have 
5 any foundational evidence to make any sort of 
6 reasonable estimate of what was attributable to that. 
7 I simply recognize that the Court -- the Appellate 
8 Courts of this State have indicated that the portion 
9 of personal injury awards attributable to loss of 
10 future earnings is appropriately considered by the 
11 Court as a marital asset. 
12 As near as the Court can tell, 26, 
13 27,000, or some reasonable close approximation 
14 thereof, was used by Mr. Woodard to acquire the 
15 Fruitland, Utah, acreage. I can't recall the specific 
16 acreage. It's described — the property is described 
17 with specificity in the original findings 1 legal 
18 descr iption . 
19 He acquired a used trailer that's 
20 there. He had a well drilled that was there; which 
21 are utilized. Given the loss on the Century Mortgage, 
22 given the loss on the transaction with M r s . Finch and 
23 considering the reasonable and rational conclusion 
24 that part of the 64,000 was for loss of future 
25 earnings, it appears that it would be reasonable under 
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1 the circumstances to recognize the Fruitland property 
2 trailer house, goat, well and any water rights 
3 attendant or in connection therewith to be property 
4 that he acquired through his burn accident, and would 
5 be a reasonable approximation of personal injuries 
6 which he received, and therefore ought to be awarded 
7 to him. And are so awarded to him. 
8 The original decree awarded one dollar 
9 for your alimony, and although thatfs~~not property 
10 settlement, per se -- the Court is going to modify the 
11 alimony award — but Mr, Woodard may continue with a 
12 dollar per year alimony, 
13 Paragraph 7 of the award in the original 
14 decree awarded personal property accumulated by the 
15 parties during their marriage awarded to each of those 
16 items in their possession, except the plaintiff was 
17 awarded the sewing machine. That provision may stand, 
18 and may be repeated in this order, 
19 Paragraph 8 provided that Lot No. Med 
20 274-A, Lots 3 and 4 of Memorial Estates, were awarded 
21 to plaintiff. Any remaining lots were awarded to 
22 defendant. Each was awarded their casket. And that 
23 provision may remain the same. 
24 This order may reflect a mutual 
25 restraining order against either contacting, 
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1 harassing, cursing, reviling and all that's gone on 
2 for a number of years. 
3 The monies in the clerks office may be 
4 maintained there in an interest bearing basis, or, 
5 alternatively, may be placed by plaintiff in an 
6 interest bearing account in a federally insured 
7 account. And plaintiff has the right to liquidate 329 
8 East Bryan Avenue, 219 East Gregson Avenue, 255 East 
9 Claybourne; realizing the maximum amounts that can be 
10 realized therefrom. Net of any reasonably 
11 demonstrable claims against those properties. And I 
12 don't have a good enough record to satisfy that, and 
13 Mrs. Evans is not a party. You are going to have to 
14 plow those issues, but Mrs. Woodard will be given the 
15 power, at least, to liquidate those amounts. 
16 Any net proceeds recognizing any other 
17 outstanding claims that may be reasonably demonstrated 
18 against them are to go in the same — either to the 
19 clerk of the court or to a federally insured account 
20 to be held for the purpose of making the following 
21 monthly -- the following distributions: 
22 The Court finds that there was little or 
23 no cooperation from Mr. Woodard in coming forward to 
24 identify marital assets or to provide documents or to 
25 help bring to the Court's attention assets of the 
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1 marital estate, and that throughout the proceedings, 
2 he has essentially drug his feet. 
3 He was in a position, it appears to the 
4 Court, to have brought forward documents that would 
5 have identified the assets, identified those who had 
6 claims against the property, where payments were made, 
7 the amounts and has failed to do so. 
8 The Court also recognizes that there's 
9 no demonstrated ability on his part to pay any of his 
10 attorney's fees. 
11 The Court also makes the additional 
12 finding that of recent times, namely in December of 
13 1978, Mr. Woodard received $30,450 from Nancy Finch, 
14 and has not made reasonable explanation of where that 
15 money went. In addition, in December of 1979, he 
16 received an additional $18,637.80 from Mrs. Finch, and 
17 he has not reasonably accounted for where that money 
18 went . 
19 The Court finds that specifically Mrs. 
20 Woodard has not received any of those funds for her 
21 use other than the Court did enter a temporary order 
22 in this matter as far back as February f80, ordering 
23 him to pay her $300 per month. And I assume based 
24 upon receipt of monthly payments on the contract with 
25 the Stewarts and arrearages that were recognized by 
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1 the Court in interim orders, that she has essentially 
2 received what she was supposed to have received under 
3 the various orders of the Court. 
4 From the monies held with the clerk of 
5 the court, $3,000 may be paid to Mr. Smith; $1,000 to 
6 Mr . Uresk. 
7 And other than that, Mr. Smith, I don't 
8 know whether you've got little kids. I assume you 
9 do. She'll work out services with baby-sitting 
10 still. If you don't overtax her. Maybe in a real 
11 pinch she will agree to scrub floors. But other than 
12 that, I think you are going to be hard pressed to 
13 collect all of that. 
14 She may have costs as are usually taxed, 
15 but the Court's perception of those are the filing 
16 fee, subpoena costs and things like that. And 
17 generally most of the others aren't awardable. But 
18 you can file your memorandum of costs and 
19 disbursements, and the Court would look at that. 
20 Other than those amounts, the Court 
21 orders that the funds can be turned over for her 
22 management. If it's turned over for her management, 
23 then she is to provide an annual accounting to Mr. 
24 Woodard. If it stays with the clerk of the court, 
25 then I assume the clerk would have an accounting. 
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Owing to the imprecision of the award of 
social security, I'll just simply round off the 
monthly award. Mrs. woodard is to receive $205 per 
month payable from that fund as alimony until the 
funds are exhausted. If that award destroys the 
supplemental award, then the monthly amount payable 
from that fund may be increased to offset the 
supplemental award, so that their monthly incomes are 
substantially equal. 
And those funds shall be held intact and 
not be otherwise disbursed without further order of 
the Court. 
Mrs. Woodard is awarded the 1980 LTD. 
Mr. Woodard is awarded the 1978, or '77, whatever it 
was, P into . 
Have I missed anything? 
MR. SMITH: Your Honor, I just have one 
question. I don't know if it — excuse me, everybody 
for asking these questions -- but assuming that --
assuming that Mrs. Woodard died and Mr. Woodard is 
alive and those funds are still intact, what happens 
to those? Do those become part of her estate, or are 
those part of Mr. Woodard's. 
THE COURT: The Court will decide that 
issue when and if it needs to. My estimate, just 
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1 looking at Mrs. Woodard, is that she's a pretty tough 
2 cookie, and she's got a number of years, and the fund 
3 is going to give way sooner than she expires. 
4 But I understand that's unknown. And 
5 because of the disparity in income, I don't see how to 
6 protect, given Mr. Woodard 's past unwillingness to 
7 cooperate, to be open and frank with her, the Court or 
8 anyone else, how those interests can be protected. 
9 And the only fair way to see that she has reasonable 
10 -- they are still under the poverty level, both of 
11 them. But at least it gives her some income stream, 
12 and it assures the payment for a number of years. I 
13 think the choice is that the Court ought to leave them 
14 intact. 
15 I suppose, if either of them can 
16 demonstrate a need for surgery or health needs that's 
17 justified, the Court would then consider those 
18 petitions and determine whether or not any of those 
19 funds can be taken to meet those needs for either of 
20 them. 
21 I suppose if my inclination is, although 
22 I don't see the need for making an order, if she dies 
23 before he does, then I suppose at that point, they can 
24 be divided half even. His half. And her half ought 
25 to go to the kids. I guess that we can put that in 
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there. There is no violence that that would do. But 
I didn't want to award them particularly to either, 
other than to keep them as a secure fund to assure the 
annuity payment to her of basically alimony until her 
death, and that's the only way I see that I can really 
effectively do that. 
MR. SMITH: Okay. 
THE COURT: I suppose you could go ahead 
and put that in there. If she predeceases him and 
there's no longer a monthly amount due her and there's 
still funds remaining, then he may have half the 
remaining funds, and the other remaining half may go 
to her heirs, or may go to whoever she appoints by 
will or power of appointment. Their heirs are 
essentially the same people. They are adult 
children. If she outlived him and she died intestate, 
they would go to their children. So I think just the 
one other alternative is sufficient. 
Anything else? 
MR. SMITH: No, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Can you draft a reasonably 
intelligent order from what I've said? 
MR. SMITH: I believe I can, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Since you got the big fee, 
you get to do it, Mr. Smith. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
OLIVE M. WOODARD, 
Plaintiff, DECREE OF DIVORCE 
vs. 
KARL WOODARD Civil No. D-79-1766 
Defendant. 
The above entitled Court having jurisdiction over the 
subject matter and of and the the parties to this action and 
having heretofore made and entered its findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, now in accordance therewith 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. Plaintiff and Defendant are each awarded a decree of 
divorce dissolving the bonds of matrimony heretofore existing 
between the parties the same to become final upon entry. 
2. Each party is hereby awarded One Dollar ($1.00) per 
year as alimony. 
3. The plaintiff is awarded as her sole separate prop-
erty any intereoc the parties may have in the real property 
located at 336, 340 and 342 Fenton Avenue, Salt Lake City, 
Utah the legal descriptions of which are: 
BEGINNING at a point on the South line of a 50 feet 
road said point being North 0°17f45" East 262.15 
feet and East 250.5 feet from the Southwest corner 
of Lot 3, Block 18, Ten Acre Plat "A", Big Field 
60 
Survey, and running thence East 59 feet along the 
said South line; thence South 0*11*45" West 262.19 
feet to the South line of said Lot 3; thence North 
89°59'3Q" West 59 feet along said South line; thence 
North 0°17'45" East 262.13 feet to the place of 
BEGINNING 
BEGINNING at a point on the Southline of a 50 foot 
road, said point being North Q°ll'<i5n East 262.15 
feet and East 309.5 feet from the Southwest corner 
of Lot 3, Block 18, Ten Acre Plat "A", Big Field 
Survey^ ,_aad..running thenge^East_ 59 feet along the 
Southline of road; thence South 0o17»45" West~262.20 
feet to the south line of said Lot 3; thence North 
39059130- west 59.0 feet along said South line; 
thence North 0°17M5" East 262.19 feet to the place 
of BEGINNING. 
BEGINNING at a point on the South line of a 50 foot 
road, being North 0°17'45" East 262.15 feet and East 
368.5 feet from the Southwest corner of Lot 3, Block 
18, Ten Acre Plat "A", Big Field Survey, and running 
thence East 59 feet along said South line; thence 
South 0°17,45" West 262.21 feet to the South line of 
Lot 3 aforesaid; thence North 89°59'30" West 59 feet 
along said South line; thence North 0°17f45" East 
262.2 feet, more or less, to the point of BEGINNING. 
4. Plaintiff is awarded all of defendant's interest in 
all monies due the defendant from one Nancy Finch, as a re-
sult of the sale of the Fenton Way properties and may imme-
ii^  Fruitland, Utah and described as follows: 
Lots 55, 56 and 57 
Plat 6, Section 20 
T. 3 South, Range 8 West 
Salt Lake Base Meridian 
are awarded to the Defendant as his sole and separate prop-
erty. 
6. The amount of Three Hundred Eighty Six Dollars and 
Eighty Seven Cents ($386.87) being paid monthly from the sale 
of the real property located at 59 Stratford Avenue^ Salt 
'Lake City, Utah is awarded to the Plaintiff until the .Three 
Hundred Dollars ($300.00) per month as and f c temporary 
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support/as ordered by the Court in this cause has been paid 
in full together with Plaintiff's attorney's fees in the sura 
of One Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($1,500.00) and h^r 
costs of court hcive been paid in full, thereafter, the 
proceeds of the sale of said real property shall be divided 
equally between the Plaintiff and the Defendant. 
7. The personal property accumulated by the parties 
during their marriage is hereby awarded to the person having 
the possession of each item and, in addition, Plaintiff is 
hereby awarded her sewing machine. 
8. Lot No. Med 274A Lot 3 & 4 of the Memorial Estates 
Cemetery is hereoy awarded to the Plaintiff and the parties 
remaining unoccupied lots at the Memorial Estates cemetery 
are hereby awarded to the Defendant. The Plaintiff and De-
fendant are each awarded one of the two caskets purchased 
with the cemetery lots. 
9. Plaintiff and defendant are both ordered to not con-
tact in any way the other, either in person or by telephone, 
and are not to come upon the premises where the other person 
may be located nor is either party, in any manner, to bother 
or in any way interfer with the other party, 
DATED at Salt Lake City, Utah this _££_~day of ^^n^sFt^/T~~ 
1982. 
BY THE J20UIV 
Kenneth Rigtrup ATTEST, 
District Judge w STERLING CVANS 
CLERK 
Approved a s t o form: - / - . > *z/.<. >" ' 
Deputy Qftr* 
Thomas R. B l o n q u i s t 
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& 
DAVID K. SMITH, ESQ. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
445 East 4500 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Telephone: 261-3459 
FILED IN CLERKS OFFICE 
Salt Lake County Utah 
MAY 2 5 1984 
H Dixon Hindley, Clerk 3rd Dist' Court 
BV —LJ^rVy ' ss~S /Is * 
Deputy Cle; 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
OLIVE M. WOODARD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs • 
KARL WOODARD, 
Defendant, 
O R D E R 
Civil No. D-79-1766 
Plaintiffs Motion for Vacation of the property distribution 
portion of the Divorce Decree came on hearing before the Honorable 
Kenneth Rigti , District Court Judge, on Monday, May 14, 1984 at 
the hour of 2:0 ">.M., and the Plaintiff having appeared by and 
through her couns David K. Smith, and the Defendant having 
appeared by and thr ih his counsel, Jane Allen, and the court 
having heard the Moti of Jane Allen to be permitted to with-
draw as counsel for the cendant and the court having granted 
said Motion, and the partic ^aving thereafter argued their 
respective causes, the court ±i Tood cause appearing, DOES NOW 
HEREBY order that the property d ribution portion of the Decree 
of Divorce entered by the above cc *. be and is the same hereby 
vacated* -*$*. 
^ £ = - 0 ^ ^ faX 1*+* &*• ^ V v v L*v (f^Y^f *"*- ^ ^ ~ ^P^l ^ 
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DATED this l£ ""day of JV^_, 1984 
BY THE COURT 
)NORABLE KENNETM RI^tRUP 
)istrict Court 4/udge 
MAILING CERTIFICATE \ „tU^^~****C'^£'L<£~t*J 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Order this 22nd day of May, 1984 to the 
following: 
Mr. Karl Woodard 
P.O. Box 733 
Fruit ^nd, Utah 84027 
DAVID K. SMITH, ESQ. 
State Bar No. 2993 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
OLIVE M. WOODARD 
Suite 300 
6925 Union Park Center 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Telephone: 566-3373 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
OLIVE M. WOODARD, ) 
Plaintiff, ) 
KARL WOODARD, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. D-79-1766 
Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for a 
non-jury trial on Friday, September 23, 1988 at 9:00 a.m. 
before the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup, Third District Court 
Judge, and the Plaintiff having been personally present and 
having been represented by her counsel, DAVID K, SMITH, 
ESQ,, and the Defendant having also been personally present 
and having been represented by his counsel, ROLAND URESK, 
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ESQ., and the various parties having been placed under oath, 
and having testified concerning the type, location and 
disposition of certain their assets, and various items of 
real evidence having been offered and introduced, and the 
court having heard the oral arguments of the counsel for the 
parties, and being fully advised in the premises, does now 
make the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Plaintiff, OLIVE M. WOODARD, and the 
Defendant, KARL WOODARD, were married to one another on 
August 1, 193 3 at Duchesne, Utah, and remained married to 
one another until the Decree of Divorce was entered in this 
matter on or about February 23, 1982. The court further 
notes that these parties were married to one another for 
nearly 49 years. 
2. The Court notes that paragraph four of the 
original Decree of Divorce provided as follows: 
"Plaintiff is awarded all of defendant's 
interest in all monies due the defendant from 
one Nancy L. Finch, as a result of the sale of 
the Fenton Way properties and may immediately 
proceed in her own name to collect the monies 
due the defendant, from Nancy Finch in the 
amount of $18,744.13 due December 1, 1981 and 
$18,744.14 due December 1, 1982, and all 
principal and interest accruing thereafter." 
3. The meaning of that particular paragraph is 
clear in the court's mind, inasmuch as the court corrected a 
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portion of the paragraph by interlineation. It was the 
court's intention that Mrs. Woodard be awarded two of the 
three annual installments to be paid by Mrs. Finch, each in 
the amount of $18,744.14 plus interest. Although the court 
subsequently heard that Mrs. Finch had filed for protection 
under the bankruptcy act, at that time the court did not 
realize that the payments were unsecured; the court believed 
that the payments were secured by a mortgage or trust deed 
in the Fenton Ave. properties. 
4. It was for this reason that the court entered an 
order on May 25, 1984 following a hearing on May 14, 1984, 
voiding the property division between the parties. The 
court felt that the property distribution portion of the 
Decree of Divorce was grounded upon a misapprehension of the 
fact that the Fenton Avenue properties were sold to Nancy L. 
Finch with a reserved security interest, when, in fact, the 
property had been deeded outright to her, without any 
reservation of a security interest back in the Fenton Avenue 
property, and the note given by Nancy L. Finch was 
unsecured. 
5. The court finds that the Plaintiff, OLIVE M. 
WOODARD is 73 years of age and that in 20 days the 
Defendant, KARL WOODARD, will be 74 years of age. The court 
finds that both parties appear to be mentally alert and 
reasonably active for their chronological ages, and this 
despite the fact that the Defendant, KARL WOODARD, suffered 
a severe burn accident in 1971. 
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6. The court finds that the Plaintiff, OLIVE M. 
WOODARD, receives $193.00 per month in Social Secuirty 
Benefits and receives a supplemental SSI benefit of $165.00, 
for a total monthly benefit of $358.00. She has no other 
source of income, other than occasional babysitting monies. 
7. The court finds that the Defendant, KARL 
WOODARD, receives $605.00 per month in Social Security 
Benefits. 
8. The court finds that given their respective ages 
and backgrounds, both parties are substantially 
unemployable. 
9. The court finds that the Defendant, KARL 
WOODARD, lives in Fruitland, Utah, and lives on a 30 acre 
parcel of property in a trailer, all of which is 
unencumbered, and raises a milk goat, and has the capacity 
to raise a garden if he so wishes to assist him in providing 
for his needs. 
10. The Plaintiff, OLIVE M. WOODARD, resides in a 
two-bedroom apartment in Salt Lake City, Utah, for which she 
pays $250.00 per month, plus gas, electric and telephone. 
11. The court takes notice that the Statutes 
regarding divorce and in particular recent case law handed 
down from the Utah Court of Appeals, which allows this court 
to make an equitable distribution of any marital property of 
the parties to a divorce, and this is particularly the case 
in long standing marriages. 
12. The court also notes that recent decisions from 
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injury awards representing sums for loss of future income 
are considered a martial asset subject to distribution 
between the parties. 
13. The court finds that the Defendant, KARL 
WOODARD, was involved in a very serious burn accident injury 
on or about February 28, 1971 in Roosevelt, Utah. He 
subsequently brought a lawsuit against several parties, and 
received a net settlement to him of approximately $64,000.00 
sometime between 1972 and 1974. Given his age at the time 
of the accident of 58 years, and the fact that he was unable 
to engage in any type of physical employment following the 
accident, the court finds that a portion of the settlement 
was undoubtedly intended as reimbursement for loss of future 
income. The precise amount which was intended as 
reimbursement for loss of future income is unknown. 
14. The court finds that KARL WOODARD used 
approximately $3 5,500.00 of the monies received from his 
burn case to purchase and remodel the home located at 5941 
and 5947 Stratler Ave., Murray, Utah 84107, in approximately 
1973; however, these sums are considered by the court to be 
monies for loss of future income, and thus subject to an 
equitable distribution between the parties by the court. 
The court notes that the Defendant received the $12,000 down 
payment and several of the monthly installments without 
making an accounting thereof to the Plaintiff. 
15. The court finds that in February, 1980 the court 
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ordered the Defendant, KARL WOODARD, to pay the Plaintiff, 
OLIVE M. WOODARD, the sum of $300.00 as and for temporary 
alimony and support and that she received funds derived from 
the sale of the Stratler Ave. property for approximately two 
years following the entry of the Decree of Divorce pursuant 
to an Order of this court and was paid the sums ordered by 
this court to be paid her by the Defendant. 
16. The court finds that KARL WOODARD used 
approximately $2 6,000.00 of his monies secured from the 
settlement on his burn accident case to aquire the 3 0 acre 
parcel of land on which he now resides in Fruitland, Utah, 
and to move a used trailer onto the property, and to drill a 
well on the property. Given the amount received from his 
settlement on his burn case, and taking into consideration a 
reasonable and rational amount for pain and suffering, the 
court finds that the monies obtained from the accident case 
used to purchase the Fruitland properties, together with the 
trailer and well, and other improvements thereon, represent 
his personal asset and are reasonably related to monies he 
received for pain and suffering he received from the 
settlement of his burn case. 
17. The court finds that the Defendant, KARL 
WOODARD, has engaged in imprudent management of his assets 
over the years. In particular, the court notes that KARL 
WOODARD invested $20,000.00 in the mid-19701s into a venture 
with Century Mortgage, and all of those funds were lost; 
furthermore, he sold the Fenton Avenue properties without 
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in a loss of an unknown sum, and more recently secured 
various loans from a Robert Evans which do not appear to 
have been secured in a business-like manner. 
18. The court finds in recent times that the 
Defendant, KARL W00DARD, received $30,450.00 from Nancy L. 
Finch as the down payment on the sale of the Fenton Ave. 
properties, and that in February 22, 1979 he received 
another $18,744.14, representing the first annual 
installment of three to become due from Nancy L. Finch. The 
court finds that he has not adequately accounted for the use 
of said funds, and that the Plaintiff, OLIVE W00DARD, did 
not have the use of any of those funds. 
19. The court specfically finds that the Defendant 
has offered little, if any, assistance to the Plaintiff in 
locating marital assets in connection with this action, and 
further finds that he had unnecessarily dragged this matter 
on, requiring the Plaintiff and/or her counsel to 
independently locate assets, which has both frustrated the 
Plaintiff and this court. Accordingly, this court should 
enter an order requiring the Defendant to contribute to the 
Plaintifffs legal fees and costs incurred in this action. 
20. On the other hand, this court finds that both 
parties1 incomes, coupled with their expenses, would suggest 
they are living below poverty level, and have little 
independent resources with which to pay court costs and/or 
legal fees. 
-7-
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
21. Paragraph two of the original decree of divorce 
provided that each party was awarded $1.00 per year as and 
for alimony from the other, and this provision should not be 
altered, but should remain in full force and effect. 
22. Paragraph seven of the original decree of 
divorce provided that the personal property accumulated by 
the parties during their marriage should be awarded to the 
person having the possession thereof at the time the decree 
was entered, and also that the Plaintiff, OLIVE W00DARD, was 
awarded her sewing maching. This paragraph should remain in 
full force and effect. 
23. The Plaintiff should further be awarded her 
1980 Ford LTD as her sole and separate property. 
24. The Defendant should further be awarded his 
Pinto automobile as his sole and separate property. 
25. Paragraph eight of the original decree of 
divorce provided that Lot No. Med 2754A , Lot 3 & 4 of the 
Memorial Estates Cemetery should be awarded to the 
Plaintiff, OLIVE W00DARD, and the parties' remaining 
unoccupied lots at Memorial Estates Cemetery should be 
awarded to the Defendant, KARL W00DARD. It further provided 
that the Plaintiff and the Defendant were each awarded one 
of the two caskets purchased with the cemetery lots. This 
paragraph should remain in full force and effect. 
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divorce provided that both the Plaintiff and the Defendant 
were ordered restrained from contacting the other, either in 
person or by telephone, or in any other way, and were not 
to come upon the premises where the other person may be 
located or reside, or in any manner from bothering or 
interfering with the person or property of the other. This 
paragraph should remain in full force and effect. 
27. The Defendant, KARL WOODARD, should be awarded 
as his sole and separate property, all right, title and 
interest in and to the following property: 
Three ten acre parcels of land designated by the 
Duchesne County Recorder's Office as Serial Nos. 
OMT-0006-0056, OMT-0006-0055, and OMT-0006-0057, 
and designated as Lots 55, 56, and 57, Plat 6, 
Section 20, Township 3 South, Range 8 West, Salt 
Lake Base and Meridian, together with any and 
all improvements thereon, and all personal 
property attached thereto. 
28. The court should award to the Plaintiff, OLIVE 
M. WOODARD, subject to certain restrictions and conditions 
set forth hereafter, the following assets: 
(A) All funds presently held by the Clerk's Office, 
which when originally deposited, came to $20,667.96, and 
which represented the remaining net proceeds from the sale 
of the parties1 property on 5941 and 5947 Stratler, Murray, 
Utah 84107. 
(B) All right, title, and interest in the property 
located at 329 East Bryan Ave., Salt Lake City, Utah 84115, 
subject to any liens or encumbrances of record. This 
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includes the right to lease the property and collect rents 
thereon, and/or to sell said property. 
The property's legal description is: The West 4 
1/2 feet of Lot 21, all of Lot 22, and the East 
1/2 Lot of Lot 23, Block 2, WATERLOO ADDITION, 
according to the official plat thereof, as 
recorded in the office of the County Recorder, 
State of Utah. 
(C) All right, title and interest in the property 
located at 219 Easty Gregson Ave., Salt Lake City, Utah 
84115, subject to any liens or encumbrances of record. This 
includes the right to lease the property, to collect the 
rents therefrom, and/or to sell the property. 
The property's legal description is: Beginning 
at the Northeast corner of Lot 2, MILL CREEK 
GARDENS ADDITION, and running thence West 10.55 
feet Sjouth 50 feet; thence West 39.45 feet; 
thence South 95.55 feet, more or less, to the 
Northerly line of 3000 South Street; thence 
Southeasterly following the curve to the 
Northerly line of 3000 South Street; to the 
Southeast corner of said Lot 2; thence North 
150.39 feet to the point of beginning. 
Together with and subject to a right of way over 
the following: Beginning 50 feet South and 
50.55 feet East of the Northwest corner of Lot 
1, said MILL CREDD GARDENS ADDITION; and running 
thence East 10 feet; thence South 95.55 feet to 
the Southeast corner of said lot 1; thence 
Northeasterly following the curve of 3000 South 
Street 10 feet, more or less, to a point 
following the jcurve of 3 000 Sjouth Street 10 
feet, more or less, to a point due south of the 
point of beginning; thence North to the place of 
Beginning. Being the East 10 feet of the South 
95 feet, more or less, to said Lot 1. 
(D) All right, title and interest in and to the 
second trust deed note dated April 26, 1982 for $29,465.67 
from Douglas A. Miller, Kenneth R. Edwards, Steven E. 
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deed interest in and to property situated at 255 East 
Claybourne Ave., Salt Lake City, Utah 84117, together with 
all rights to any payments received therefrom, and all 
security interests in the property described as follows: 
The East 1/2 of Lot 8, Block 2, CENTRAL PARK 
PLAT "A", according to the official plat 
thereof, recorded in Block II of Plats at Page 
144, records of Salt Lake County, Utah. 
Also: Beginning at the Southeast Corner of Lot 
7, Block 2, Central Park Plat MA", and running 
thence North 121 feet; thence West 32 feet; 
thence South 10 feet; thence West 10 feet; 
thence SJouth 111 feet; thence East 42 feet, to 
the point of beginning. Subject to a Deed of 
Trust in favor of Deseret Federal Savings and 
Loan Association, a corporation organized and 
existing under the laws of the United States of 
America, dated April 19, 1979 in the original 
principal sum of $58,850.00. 
29. The Plaintiff, OLIVE WOODARD, may either place 
the proceeds from said lease or sale of said parcels with 
the Clerk of this Court in an interest bearing account, or 
she may place said proceeds in a federally insured 
institution of her choice, provided she gives the Defendant, 
KARL WOODARD, and annual accounting with respect to the 
distributions made from said account. 
30. The Plaintiff, OLIVE WOODARD, shall be entitled 
to manage said funds subject to the provisions of paragraph 
thirty below. 
31. The Plaintiff's Counsel, DAVID K. SMITH, shall 
be entitled to withdraw from the proceeds now on deposit 
with the Clerk of the Court $3,000.00 towards his attorneyfs 
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fees, together with such actual costs as may be awarded by 
the Court, and the Defendant's Counsel, ROLAND URESK, shall 
be entitled to withdraw from the proceeds now on deposit 
with the Cleric of the Court $1,000.00 towards his attorney's 
fees. 
32. The Plaintiff, OLIVE WOODARD, shall be entitled 
to withdraw from said funds on deposit no more than $245.00 
per month for so long as the funds permit; however, should 
her supplemental Social Security Benefits of $165.00 be 
diminished, she may increase the amount of the monthly 
withdrawal by the amount her supplemental Social Security 
Benefits are decreasd per month. 
33. Should the Plaintiff predecease the Defendant, 
and there remain undistributed funds or interest, then one-
half of the undispursed funds at her death should revert to 
the estate, heirs or assigns of the Plaintiff, and one-half 
of the undispursed funds should revert to the Defendant or 
his designees, heirs or assigns. 
DATED this day of September, 1988. 
BY THE COURT: 
KENNETH RIGTRUP 
Third District Court Judge 
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Approved as to Form: 
ROLAND URESK, ESQ. 
Attorney for Defendant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW to the following Counsel for the Defendant this day 
of September, 1988: 
ROLAND URESK, ESQ. 
Attorney at Law 
Zions Bank Building 
156 North 200 East 
Roosevelt, Utah 84066 
DAVID K. SMITH, ESQ. 
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DAVID K. SMITH, ESQ. 
State Bar No. 2993 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
OLIVE M. WOODARD 
Suite 300 
6925 Union Park Center 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Telephone: 56 6-3 3 73 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH . 
OLIVE M. WOODARD, ) 
Plaintiff, ) 
KARL WOODARD, 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. D-79-1766 
Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup 
BASED UPON the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law heretofore entered in the above captioned matter 
1. Paragraph two of the original decree of divorce 
which provided that each party was awarded $1.00 per year as 
and for alimony from the other, and this provision is not 
altered, but shall remain in full force and effect. 
2. Paragraph seven of the original decree of 
i > \hS 
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accumulated by the parties during their marriage should be 
awarded to the person having the possession thereof at the 
time the decree was entered, and also that the Plaintiff, 
OLIVE WOODARD, was awarded her sewing maching, shall remain 
in full force and effect, 
3. The Plaintiff is further awarded her 1980 Ford 
LTD as her sole and separate property. 
4. The Defendant is awarded his Pinto automobile as 
his sole and separate property. 
5. Paragraph eight of the original decree of 
divorce provided that Lot No. Med 2754A , Let 3 & 4 of the 
Memorial Estates1 Cemetery should be awarded to the 
Plaintiff, OLIVE WOODARD, and the parties1 remaining 
unoccupied lots at Memorial Estates Cemetery should be 
awarded to the Defendant, KARL WOODARD. It further provided 
that the Plaintiff and the Defendant were each awarded one 
of the two caskets purchased with the cemetery lots. This 
paragraph shall remain in full force and effect. 
6. Paragraph nine of the original decree of divorce 
provided that both the Plaintiff and the Defendant were 
ordered restrained from contacting the other, either in 
person or by telephone, or in any other way, and were not 
to come upon the premises where the other person may be 
located or reside, or in any manner from bothering or 
interfering with the person or property of the other. This 
paragraph shall remain in full force and effect. 
7. The Defendant, KARL WOODARD, shall be awarded as 
his sole and separate property, all right, title and 
interest in and to the following property: 
Three ten acre parcels of land designated by the 
Duchesne County Recorder's Office as Serial Nos. 
OMT-0006-0056, OMT-0006-U055, and OMT-0006-0057, 
and designated as Lots 55, 56, and 57, Plat 6, 
Section 20, Township 3 South, Range 8 West, Salt 
Lake Base and Meridian, together with any and 
all improvements thereon, and all personal 
property attached thereto. 
f0*. fa *^ 0^4^^ 
8. The court awards £* the Plaintiff, OLIVE M. 
WOODARD, subject to certain restrictions and conditions set 
forth hereafter, the following assets: 
(A) All funds presently held by the Clerk's Office, 
which when originally deposited, came to $20,667.96, and 
which represented the remaining net proceeds from the sale 
of the parties' property on 5941 and 5947 Stratler, Murray, 
Utah 84107. 
(B) All right, title, and interest in the property 
located at 329 East Bryan Ave., Salt Lake City, Utah 84115, 
subject to any liens or encumbrances of record. This 
includes the right to lease the property and collect rents 
thereon, and/or to sell said property. 
The property's legal description is: The West 4 
1/2 feet of Lot 21, all of Lot 22, and the East 
1/2 Lot of Lot 23, Block 2, WATERLOO ADDITION, 
according to the official plat thereof, as 
recorded in the office of the County Recorder, 
State of Utah. 
(C) All right, title and interest in the property 
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located at 219 Easty Gregson Ave., Salt Lake City, Utah 
84115, subject to any liens or encumbrances of record. This 
includes the right to lease the property, to collect the 
rents therefrom, and/or to sell the property. 
The property's legal description is: Beginning 
at the Northeast corner of Lot 2, MILL CREEK 
GARDENS ADDITION, and running thence West 10.55 
feet Sjouth 50 feet; thence West 39.45 feet; 
thence South 95.55 feet, more or less, to the 
Northerly line of 3000 South Street; thence 
Southeasterly following the curve to the 
northerly line of 3000 South Street; to the 
Southeast corner of said Lot 2; thence North 
150.39 feet to the point of beginning. 
Together with and subject to a right of way over 
the following: Beginning 50 feet South and 
50.55 feet East of the Northwest corner of Lot 
1, said MILL CREDD GARDENS ADDITION; and running 
thence East 10 feet; thence South 95.55 feet to 
the Southeast corner of said lot .1; thence 
Northeasterly following the curve of 3000 South 
Street 10 feet, more or less, to a point 
following the jcurve of 3000 Sjouth Street 10 
feet, more or less, to a point due south of the 
point of beginning; thence North to the place of 
Beginning. Being the East 10 feet of the South 
95 feet, more or less, to said Lot 1. 
(D) All right, title and interest in and to the 
second trust deed note dated April 26, 1982 for $29,465.67 
from Douglas A. Miller, Kenneth R. Edwards, Steven E. 
Culligan and Larry D. Welch, given to secure a second trust 
deed interest in and to property situated at 255 East 
Claybourne Ave., Salt Lake City, Utah 84117, together with 
all rights to any payments received therefrom, and all 
security interests in the property described as follows: 
The East 1/2 of Lot 8, Block 2, CENTRAL PARK 
PLAT MA!I, according to the official plat 
thereof, recorded in Block II of Plats at Page 
144, records of Salt Lake County, Utah. 
Also: Beginning at the Southeast Corner of Lot 
7, Block 2, Central Park Plat "AM, and running 
thence North 121 feet; thence West 32 feet; 
thence South 10 feet; thence West 10 feet; 
thence SJouth 111 feet; thence East 42 feet, to 
the point of beginning. Subject to a Deed of 
Trust in favor of Deseret Federal Savings and 
Loan Association, a corporation organized and 
existing under the laws of the United States of 
America, dated April 19, 1979 in the original 
principal sum of $58,850.00. 
v. The Plaintiff, OLIVE WOODARD, may either place 
the proceeds from said lease or sale of said parcels with 
the Clerk of this Court in an interest bearing account, or 
she may place said proceeds in a federally insured 
K£- %Jtt°^ uJXtA* &£<*** <;#* ^^u^J? $~<& M*t C* 
institution of her choice,j[ provided she gives the Defendant,C&^A *& ^ 3 
KARL WOODARD, and annual accounting with respect to the 
distributions made from said account. 
10. The Plaintiff, OLIVE WOODARD, is entitled to 
manage said funds_ subject to the provisions of paragraph 
twelve/below. 
11. The Plaintiff's Counsel, DAVID K. SMITH, is 
entitled to withdraw from the proceeds now on deposit with 
the Clerk of the Court $3,000.00 towards his attorney's 
fees, together with such actual costs as may be awarded by 
the Court, and the Defendant's Counsel, ROLAND URESK, is 
entitled to withdraw from the proceeds now on deposit with 
the Clerk of the Court $1,000.00 towards his attorney's 
fees, 
12. The Plaintiff, OLIVE WOODARD, shall be entitled 
to withdraw from said funds on deposit no more than $245.00 
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per month for so long as the funds permit; however, should 
her supplemental Social Security Benefits of $165.00 i* 
diminished, she may increase the amount of the monthly 
withdrawal by the amount her supplemental Social Security 
Benefits are decreasd per month. 
13. Slioul 1 Mi<» Plaintiff predecease the Defendant, 
and there remain undistributed funds or interest J then one-
half of the undispursed funds;/^ at her death shall revert to 
the estate, heirs or assigns of tt>e Plaintiff, and one-half 
of the undispursed funds,/shall revert to the Defendant or 
his designees, heirs or assigns. ..^ 
DATED this /I ~^day of Scptomb^r, 1988, 
1 CERTIFY THAT THIS IS A TRUE COPY OF AN 
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT ON RLE Si WB. THIRD 
DISTRICT OHJRT. SALT LAKE CCfcJWTy, STATE OF 
UTAH. V ^> 
DATE. 
DEPUTY COURT&ERK 
BY THE COURT: 
-I'Uto/-
CENNETH RIGTRUI 
Third District Court Judge 
Approved as to Form: 
ROLAND URESK, ESQ. 
Attorney for Defendant 
M&U**J/-4Z 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that T mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT to the following Counsel for 
tis^lr the Defendant th: day of September, 1988 
ROLAND URESK, ESQ. 
Attorney at Law 
Zions Bank Building 
156 North 200 East 
Roosevelt, Utah 84066 
0 \ * <. 
DAVID K. SMITH, ESQ, 
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